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Bible and Church, Bultmann and Augustine: 
A Response to David Congdon
R. W. L. Moberly
Durham University
Abstract — I respond here to Congdon’s 2014 response to my 2012 es­
say on Bultmann and Augustine. I argue that although Congdon offers a 
useful account of Bultmann’s theology and ecclesiology on its own terms, 
he does not sufficiently relate this to the question of the relationship 
between biblical interpretation, ecclesiology, and the social nature of 
knowledge, which I find to be well articulated by Augustine. I critique 
Bultmann’s application of justification by faith alone to epistemology, 
which seems to underlie his reticence about the possible epistemologi­
cal significance of ecclesiology. And I suggest that Bultmann’s program 
for theological interpretation, although it has enduring depth and chal­
lenge, is nonetheless significantly limited as a resource for contemporary 
theological interpretation.
Key Words — Bultmann, Augustine, ecclesiology, presuppositions, demythologiz-
ing, plausibility structure, social nature of knowledge, biblical truth
One of the time­honored functions of journal articles is not just to 
think aloud and try out ideas but also to enter into dialogue with col­
leagues. So I am grateful to David Congdon for his response to my essay of 
a couple of years ago on Bultmann and Augustine, 1 and also to Joel Green 
as editor for giving space to my response to his response.
It is not always easy to respond to a critique of one’s work, as there 
is a temptation to fall into self­justification, which is usually an unlovely 
and unedifying spectacle. But I hope that this exchange will perhaps clarify 
some issues in a way that will be not without value for readers who are inter­
ested in the current debates about the nature of theological interpretation.
The key issue in my first essay was what creates for contemporary 
readers of the Bible the preunderstanding, the expectation, that the Bible 
1. David W. Congdon, “Kerygma and Community: A Response to R. W. L. Mo berly’s
Revisiting of Bultmann,” Journal of Theological Interpretation 8 (2014): 1–21; and my “Theolog­
ical Interpretation, Presuppositions, and the Role of the Church: Bultmann and Augustine 
Revisited,” Journal of Theological Interpretation 6 (2012): 1–22.
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contains, or at least may contain, truth about the living God and about hu­
man life as it ought to be in relation to God—rather than, say, solely con­
taining ancient history and fascinating mythology, or solely being a major 
cultural item in Western civilization. My thesis was that the church (under­
stood widely and flexibly) plays a key role in this preunderstanding, as what 
sociologists call a “plausibility structure.” In other words, what we hold to 
be true relates to what significant others also hold and in the past have held 
to be true. I suggested that, although Bultmann holds this classic preunder­
standing about the Bible, he offers no sufficient account of why he does 
so. By contrast, I argued that Augustine offers a classic articulation of the 
point at issue in his famous and often­misunderstood saying, “I would not 
believe the gospel if the authority of the Catholic Church did not move 
me.” In the secular and post­Christendom context of contemporary life 
(at any rate in Britain and Europe) it is important to be able to articulate 
afresh why the Bible should be privileged with the preunderstanding that 
it contains, or at least may contain, ultimate truth.
Congdon’s Thesis
Congdon’s primary concern in his essay is, I think, to commend Bult­
mann as a fundamental resource both for hermeneutics and for missiology 
in a contemporary context. He starts with my recent essay, at least in part 
because my essay, in his judgment, nicely illustrates the widespread prob­
lem that too many scholars simply misread Bultmann. My reading of him 
is better than some, but it nonetheless shows “just how far the scholarly 
world still has to go in order to truly appreciate the life and legacy of Ru­
dolf Bultmann.” 2
In the final section of his essay, Congdon seeks freshly to commend 
Bultmann’s controversial program of demythologizing. He sets out Bult­
mann’s account of divine grace and its relation to the Christian kerygma, a 
kerygma that is “simultaneously divine and human, a single divine­human 
event of proclamation that justifies the sinful hearer.” This kerygma “has 
to be differentiated from every theological conceptualization or objecti­
fication of it (for example, myths, creeds, and doctrines), because those 
conceptualizations are cultural phenomena that can, at best, only bear wit­
ness to the event within a particular time and place.” Indeed, “the kerygma 
is always open to new situations and new conceptualities. Or as Bultmann 
would say, the kerygma has to be translated.” This point is none other 
than “the program of demythologizing—a program whose logic is not de­
termined by modernity but by the gospel itself.” This logic, whereby the 
kerygma must not be restricted to or confused with any of its particular 
instantiations, applies universally, including to Scripture itself: “Bultmann 
2. Congdon, “Response,” 15.
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realized it was inconsistent for theologians in the Confessing Church to 
criticize the confusion of gospel and culture in their present­day context 
if they were not similarly critical of the confusion of gospel and culture in 
past contexts, including the context of the NT itself.” 3
Congdon suggests two potentially fruitful applications of this insight. 
First, with regard to contemporary interest in theological interpretation, 
he suggests that it should help make theological interpreters more rigor­
ously self­critical. The widespread tendency to appeal to a “Rule of Faith” 
as a necessary presupposition for theological interpretation and to see the 
content of this rule as “the theological norms conceptualized and codi­
fied in the ecumenical creeds,” is “often in danger of failing to interrogate 
the cultural­historical presuppositions behind these purportedly universal 
statements of Christian faith.” Theological interpreters “must therefore 
develop a theological hermeneutic commensurate with the fact that the 
kerygma cannot be confined or conflated with the assumptions of their 
particular situation, even if those assumptions are internal to the canonical 
Scriptures or the ecumenical ‘Rule of Faith.’” 4
Second, and related, Congdon finds here a crucial missional herme­
neutic. Bultmann “anticipated missiological insights within his hermeneu­
tical program long before the intersection of missiology and hermeneutics 
entered the theological academy.” The point is that “biblical interpreters, 
like missionaries past and present, must learn that all interpretation, all 
mission, is about their own conversion to the infinite and unanticipat­
able translatability of the gospel. . . . A demythologizing hermeneutic is 
therefore an emancipatory hermeneutic that creates a pentecostal space of 
interpretive freedom for new possibilities of mutual understanding and 
transcultural hybridity.” 5
These are major issues that indeed merit serious discussion.
Would Bultmann Have Agreed with Augustine?
Despite the intrinsic interest of Congdon’s account of Bultmann, I 
come away from his essay slightly puzzled. This is because Congdon leaves 
unclear the issue of how Bultmann (rightly understood) would have re­
sponded to the thesis of my essay. My prime concern was not with Bult­
mann but with Augustine, and specifically Augustine’s famous statement, 
“I would not believe the gospel if the authority of the Catholic Church 
did not move me.” After setting this in its context of origin, I related it 
to Berger and Luckmann’s notion of a plausibility structure, which I fur­
ther developed via Lesslie Newbigin’s account of local congregations as 
3. Ibid., 16, 17, 20.
4. Ibid., 18, 19.
5. Ibid., 19, 20.
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plausibility structures, so as to argue that “the biblical portrayal of human 
nature and destiny will present itself to consciousness as reality only to the 
extent that its appropriate plausibility structure, the church in its many 
forms, is kept in existence.” 6 In other words, my thesis was that Bible and 
church necessarily belong together in ways that, if they are rightly appreci­
ated, offer scope for moving beyond the polarization of Bible and church 
that has so often derailed Western theology since the Reformation.
My discussion of Bultmann is ancillary to this prime concern—indeed, 
it might be suggested that I use Bultmann as a springboard for commend­
ing Augustine rather as Congdon uses me as a springboard for commending 
Bultmann. Why discuss Bultmann? The obvious point of entry was that 
one of Bultmann’s most famous essays on biblical hermeneutics concerns 
appropriate preunderstandings for biblical interpretation: “Is Exegesis 
without Presuppositions Possible?” 7 Moreover, Bultmann is one of the gi­
ants of 20th­century biblical interpretation and theology; he has the stat­
ure to bear some comparison with Augustine. If there are presuppositions 
or preunderstandings that are validly brought to biblical interpretation, 
then what does Bultmann consider them to be? Especially if I want to ar­
gue that the life and witness of the Christian churches is in important ways 
a legitimate presupposition, at least for belief in the biblical content, then 
what does Bultmann have to say about it? Here, I commended Bultmann’s 
argument for the hermeneutical importance of a life relation to the subject 
matter of the text, but suggested that Bultmann had other presuppositions 
also, about which he was silent or perhaps unaware, at least in this specific 
discussion of the issue. In particular, I contended that Bultmann’s ecclesi­
ology is thin and that he fails to recognize the epistemological importance 
of the church.
Put differently, nowhere in his essay on presuppositions—or indeed in 
any other essay of which I am aware (though I may well have missed some­
thing)—does Bultmann reflect on how he knows that the Bible, or at least 
the Pauline and Johannine portions of the NT, offers unique and definitive 
truth (the kerygma). For example, he nowhere argues that he has studied 
all the world’s great religious texts and traditions and in the light of that 
study he has decided that he finds in the NT what he finds nowhere else. 
The conviction of unique and definitive truth in the NT is as much his 
starting point as his conclusion in his long scholarly career, however much 
he has had to probe, criticize, and appropriate his starting point so as to 
arrive at his conclusion. I suggested that it is his lifelong membership of 
the Lutheran Church, which privileges the NT and indeed privileges a par­
6. Moberly, “Theological Interpretation,” 20.
7. Rudolf Bultmann, “Is Exegesis without Presuppositions Possible?” in New Testament 
and Mythology and Other Basic Writings (ed. and trans. Schubert M. Ogden; London: SCM, 
1985), 145–53.
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ticular emphasis on Paul and John, that has provided him with the crucial 
preunderstanding of where unique and definitive truth is to be found, and 
I suggested that he has not sufficiently reflected on how much he owes to 
this ecclesial context that he has made his own. In effect, I was suggesting 
that it might be said of Bultmann, even if he would not have said it himself, 
that “he would not believe the kerygma if the authority of the Lutheran 
Church did not move him.”
Congdon’s response to my contention that “Bultmann, thoroughgo­
ing Liberal Protestant that he was, had little to say theologically about the 
church” 8 is to argue that I have misread him: “Bultmann’s work evinces a 
longstanding engagement with the question of the church that Moberly 
seems to have overlooked. . . . our only access to Jesus is through the 
church’s witness to him. Ecclesiology is included at all times within Chris­
tology. Kerygma is inseparable from the ecclesial community.” Indeed, “in 
his final statement on the relation between the kerygma and the historical 
Jesus, Bultmann concludes with the axiomatic statement: ‘There is no faith 
in Christ which would not be at the same time faith in the church as the 
bearer of the kerygma, that is, in dogmatic terminology: faith in the Holy 
Spirit.’” 9
It is one thing to maintain that Bultmann indeed had an integral eccle­
siology, but the significant question in my essay concerns the role that ec­
clesiology may appropriately play. No doubt kerygma and ecclesiology are 
inseparable for Bultmann, because that is ultimately a formal and structural 
observation about the interrelationship of NT, kerygma, and church. This 
interrelationship Bultmann had no desire to deny, especially in a context 
of resisting certain kinds of natural theology as proposed by National So­
cialism. But does such an ecclesiology have epistemological significance in 
the way that I argue that the Catholic Church has for Augustine? Congdon 
does not really address this. Toward the end of my essay, I explicitly raised 
the issue of the possible relationship between Bultmann and Augustine in 
terms of ecclesiology and the social nature of knowledge. I observed of 
Bultmann that “when he touches on the social nature of knowledge, it is 
only family and nation, not church, that are mentioned as formative fac­
tors. He would not, I imagine, have given a positive reading to Augustine’s 
sentence.” 10 But although Congdon takes me to task for misreading Bult­
mann’s silence about the church in the text to which I was referring, 11 he 
still seems to think it sufficient simply to maintain that Bultmann “does 
not ignore the church in the least” but rather in reality he had a “very lively 
8. Moberly, “Theological Interpretation,” 21.
9. Congdon, “Response,” 10, 11.
10. Moberly, “Theological Interpretation,” 21.
11. Congdon maintains that, “by refraining from putting the church alongside family 
and Volk­community, [Bultmann] was actually preserving the insight that the church is always 
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interest in it,” 12 without explicitly discussing how his ecclesiology func­
tions in relation to the social nature of knowledge, which was the point 
at issue.
Would Bultmann have agreed with Augustine? Although Congdon 
does not address this question, my reading of Congdon makes me more 
confident than before that the answer to that question is “no.” The reason 
for this “no” is, I think, worth probing, as it relates to Bultmann’s pro­
gramme of demythologizing.
Some Aspects of Demythologizing
It is difficult in a short space even to begin to do justice to Bultmann’s 
program of demythologizing. For example, that aspect on which I briefly 
focused in my essay, the intrinsic limitations of religious language, which 
necessarily depicts that which lies beyond the world with the categories 
of the world as though it were something within the world, is not Cong­
don’s concern. For convenience, I will focus solely on those dimensions 
that Congdon highlights.
First, Congdon emphasizes the importance of distinguishing “between 
the subject matter (die Sache) of Scripture and its cultural­historical form (in­
clusive of language, conceptuality, and world­picture)” because “Bultmann’s 
program of demythologizing begins by differentiating between the two.” 
On the one hand, “the kerygma (that is, the subject matter of the text) is 
permanently alien, because it is the scandal of the crucified Christ.” On 
the other hand, “the mythical world­picture becomes a false scandal when 
its historical strangeness is made necessary to the kerygma itself, in which 
case one is forced to believe not only the word of the gospel but also the 
cultural context within which this gospel originally took root (thereby ef­
fectively deifying that ancient cultural situation and rendering the gospel 
untranslatable into different cultural situations).” 13
Second, Congdon sets out Bultmann’s understanding of demythologiz­
ing as intrinsic to the gospel and faith on the grounds that faith “insists on 
the liberation from bondage to every world-picture that objectifying thinking con-
ceptualizes, whether it is the thinking of myth or the thinking of science.” 
In a footnote, he also cites a famous and substantive account of how Bult­
mann understands the significance of demythologizing for epistemology:
In fact, radical demythologizing is the parallel to the Pauline-Lutheran doc-
trine of justification through faith alone without the works of the law. Or, 
rather, it is the consistent application of this doctrine to the field of knowledge. 
a missionary church, always an eschatological reality. Or, as he would later put it, the church is 
always included in the event of the kerygma” (“Response,” 15). I am not sure that I find this 
account of the silence to be entirely persuasive.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., 8, 9.
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Like the doctrine of justification, it destroys every false security and 
every false demand of human beings for security, whether the secu­
rity is grounded on our good action or on our established knowledge. 
Those who would believe in God as their God need to know that they 
have nothing in hand on the basis of which they could believe, that 
they are poised, so to speak, in midair and cannot request any proof of 
the truth of the word that addresses them. For the ground and object 
of faith are identical. They alone find security who let all security go, 
who—to speak with Luther—are ready to enter into inner darkness. 14
Although the issues here are many and complex, my brief response to these 
two contentions is that I disagree with both of them, as I do not so under­
stand the Bible or the nature of Christian faith.
First, I do not see how one can so sharply distinguish between an 
enduring subject­matter and a historically contingent form, between the 
event of the kerygma and the content of its theological packaging. If the 
kerygma “is the scandal of the crucified Christ,” then the subject­matter 
and the form in certain ways are inseparable. “Christ” is an ancient Jewish 
title, which without Israel’s Scriptures, Jewish reception of those Scriptures 
in antiquity, and the reworking of the title through the words and deeds of 
Jesus in the Gospels, can hardly be understood. “Crucified” depicts a par­
ticular form of ancient Roman execution, which not only requires some 
historical knowledge of what the practice involved but also needs some fur­
ther account of why this particular crucifixion matters in a way that other 
crucifixions carried out by the Romans do not. Neither of these terms is 
meaningful without some knowledge of their first­century context (and the 
same might perhaps also, though less straightforwardly, be said of the Pau­
line concept of “scandal”). To say this is not a matter of “effectively deifying 
that ancient cultural context and rendering the gospel untranslatable into 
different cultural situations” but rather a matter of maintaining that a par­
ticular history and story is necessary for giving content to the gospel, as in 
the historic Christian practice of privileging the Bible as a whole and the 
Gospels in particular in worship and study, both corporate and private. It is 
not a matter of denying that “the biblical writings must be translated,” 15 but 
rather of holding that the content that needs to be translated is not simply 
detachable from its ancient and originating form. 16
Second, the consistent application of justification through faith alone 
to epistemology surely cuts down good trees along with bad. To be sure, 
people can have false securities that need to be removed before they can 
14. Ibid., 17 (emphasis original).
15. Ibid., 9.
16. I find myself in full agreement with the discussion of this issue in the fine recent 
essay by Kavin Rowe, “The Kerygma of the Earliest Church,” in Beyond Bultmann: Reckoning a 
New Testament Theology (ed. Bruce Longenecker and Mikeal Parsons; Waco, TX: Baylor Uni­
versity Press, 2014), 23–37, esp. pp. 31–34.
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genuinely hear and respond to the gospel. The letting­go of things in which 
one has invested oneself so as to be free to respond to God in faith can 
indeed feel like entering into darkness. But I cannot see why this has to 
be the sole account of faith that is given. Bultmann has too little to say 
about the nature of trust, reason, and judgment, not least of what may 
move people to make a thoughtful and trusting decision that the content 
of the Bible and of Christian faith can be lifegiving for them. This, I think 
(if I may venture an impressionistic judgment), lies at the heart of the wide­
spread reservation about Bultmann’s program of demythologizing that was 
often expressed within the churches during his lifetime. It was not that 
people could not see the point that language drawn from life in this world 
is intrinsically limited in depicting the reality of God but rather that Bult­
mann was happy to make negative judgments about the value of content 
and processes for formulating responsible judgments that people generally 
find helpful. Congdon reminds us that for Bultmann both historical­ critical 
study and philosophy are “only negatively relevant to Christian faith,” and 
that for Bultmann “the Christian is free to investigate history because she 
does not look to the phenomena of history as the source of her identity 
coram deo.” 17 But what if one looks to history, both past and present, not 
as a potential source of identity but as potentially providing reasons one 
might or might not trust a certain account of reality in such a way as to 
dare to discover one’s identity coram deo? What for Bultmann was a matter 
of removing obstacles to true faith felt to many like sawing off the branch 
on which they were sitting. And I cannot see that this feeling is unjustified.
Conclusion
There is so much more that might be said. But the purpose of this 
short essay is not to give any thoroughgoing appraisal of Bultmann, or even 
a complete response to Congdon’s critique of my previous essay. Rather, 
there are two concerns.
The first is to reiterate the issue of ecclesiology and the social nature 
of knowledge in relation to taking the Bible seriously as a (potential) source 
of truth about God and human life. My concerns here seem to me to have 
been left untouched by Congdon’s argument that Bultmann has a more in­
tegral ecclesiology than I had credited him with. Although those who wish 
to offer an account of taking God and the Bible seriously sometimes ap­
peal to philosophy (and presuppositions in a philosophical­cum­theological 
sense) as a prime resource, and philosophy can indeed play an invaluable 
role, 18 there are also valuable and underutilized resources that sociology, 
17. Congdon, “Response,” 5.
18. The conceptual resources of, e.g., Alasdair MacIntyre (e.g., Whose Justice? Which Ra-
tionality? [London: Duckworth, 1988]) and Nicholas Lash (e.g., The Beginning and the End of 
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and especially sociology of knowledge, offers. One can constructively re­
think the relationship of Bible and church in ways that not only offer de­
liverance from the historic stand­offs between Protestant and Catholic but 
also make better sense of how and why, in a secular and religiously plural 
society (or university), it can make sense to recognize certain ancient docu­
ments as the Bible and to privilege their contents. Put differently, I think 
there is an enduring wisdom in Augustine’s “I would not believe the gospel 
if the authority of the Catholic Church did not move me.”
My second concern is to express reservations about aspects of Bult­
mann’s approach to the Bible at a time when there appears to be a renewed 
interest in his work. 19 I do not for a moment deny the genius of Bult­
mann, or wish to denigrate the intellectual and existential rigor, breadth, 
and depth of his work. Not for nothing is he a major landmark in 20th­
century biblical and theological scholarship. There is undoubted need for 
the work of scholars like David Congdon who seek to clarify the true na­
ture of Bultmann’s thought and to establish his achievement in relation to 
his own context of life and work. Nor can I deny that my own reading of 
Bultmann, and of the secondary literature related to him, is selective and 
patchy, or that there are important nuances and distinctions in his thought 
that have no doubt escaped me.
Nonetheless, unless I am greatly mistaken in such reading as I have 
done, I think there is need for discernment and reserve in seeking to re­
claim Bultmann as a major resource at the present time, not least in the 
area of theological interpretation of Scripture. 20 One undoubted factor 
in this judgment is that I work primarily in the field of OT interpretation, 
where the kind of work that I do—as indicated by the subtitle of my most 
recent book, Reading the Hebrew Bible as Christian Scripture 21—would have 
been unthinkable for Bultmann himself (whose limited appreciation of the 
OT dismayed not a few of his contemporaries). The resources of the recent 
literary and hermeneutical turns in scholarship were largely unknown to 
Bultmann, but they substantially reconfigure the interpretive challenges. 
But perhaps the bottom line is that in important ways I simply disagree 
with Bultmann (insofar as I understand him) about God’s ways with the 
world as these should be understood in the light of Scripture. I do not for 
‘Religion’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)) are in my judgment indispensable 
for ressourcement and fresh light in theological interpretation of Scripture.
19. In addition to Congdon’s own work, and the material he cites in his first footnote 
(“Response,” 1), there is the significant recent volume by Bruce Longenecker and Mikeal Par­
sons, eds., Beyond Bultmann: Reckoning a New Testament Theology (Waco, TX: Baylor University 
Press, 2014).
20. This is a recurrent note also in the essays in Beyond Bultmann, alongside enormous 
respect for Bultmann’s achievement.
21. R. W. L. Moberly, Old Testament Theology: Reading the Hebrew Bible as Christian Scrip-
ture (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2013).
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a moment doubt or deny that Christ, and faith in Christ crucified and risen 
that is given through God’s grace, should be at the heart of understanding 
and entering into God’s ways with the world. But the question is how this 
works out and what it does and does not entail. Congdon, for example, cites 
Bultmann as holding that “human beings outside Christian faith are indeed 
unable to come to an answer [to the question of God]. . . . [Christian faith] 
claims that all answers outside the Christian answer are illusions.” 22 If this 
means what it says, then I beg to differ. I do not believe the theological 
content and affirmations of Israel’s Scriptures to be illusory, nor do I be­
lieve that the other “Abrahamic” faiths, Judaism and Islam, whatever their 
possible deficiencies from a Christian perspective, are illusory. Or at any 
rate, they are not necessarily illusory, and if in practice they can be illusory 
that is equally true of much Christian faith also.
In other words, I find Bultmann’s vision of theology, faith, and the 
Bible to be in certain ways constricted and constricting. If this invites a tu 
quoque in terms of the limitations of my own preferred frame of reference, 
so be it. Let debate continue! But I would plead that any revival of interest 
in Bultmann, other than strictly in terms of historical theology, should sub­
mit his preferred categories of thought to critical interaction with other 
categories of thought, both older and more recent than his, which offer 
other ways of taking seriously the challenges of Christian faith and faith­
fulness for biblical interpretation in the contemporary world.
22. Congdon, “Response,” 3 (citing Bultmann’s “Die Frage der natürlichen Offenba­
rung,” in Glauben und Verstehen [4 vols.; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1952–67], 2:86).
